The gathering of Shanghai Cooperation Organization leaders in Moscow offered Pakistan a fresh reminder of how deeply its regional fortunes hinge on diplomacy rather than on the lonely comfort of strategic isolation. For Islamabad, the summit was never only about the official speeches delivered beneath chandeliers and national flags. It was, as so often in these multilateral settings, the corridor conversations and carefully choreographed meetings on the sidelines that carried the real weight. Pakistan’s deputy prime minister and foreign minister, Ishaq Dar, arrived in Moscow not simply to participate, but to reassert the country’s place in a region where alliances are shifting and anxieties are rising.
Dar’s meeting with China’s premier, Li Qiang, set the tone for Pakistan’s diplomatic agenda. Both sides framed it as a renewal rather than a reset, insisting that their partnership had endured global turbulence without losing its shape. The language was familiar and warm, echoing decades of ritualized assurances: pledges to deepen strategic coordination, tributes to the “Shanghai spirit”, and commitments to strengthen cooperation on security and economic matters. Yet beneath these phrases lay a more pragmatic reality. Pakistan’s dependence on China—politically, economically, and increasingly in matters of regional security—has only intensified.
At a moment when Pakistan’s economy remains fragile, when the country is battling inflation, negotiating international loans and facing painful fiscal reforms, Beijing’s support continues to serve as a political lifeline. China remains the only major power willing to offer Pakistan large-scale infrastructure investment, even when India is openly hostile and Western governments remain cautious. And while critics worry about long-term debt and strategic overreach associated with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, the leadership in Islamabad sees Beijing as its most reliable counterweight in a region where stakes are rising and options are narrowing.
Dar’s separate encounter with Vladimir Putin provided a different but equally significant diplomatic signal. The Russian president used his public remarks to emphasize regional stability, connectivity and the economic platforms that bind Eurasia together. After two decades of expansion, the SCO has become one of Moscow’s preferred stages for projecting influence, especially at a time when relations with Western governments have hardened dramatically. The organization allows Russia to promote an alternative architecture of cooperation—one that sidelines Western dominance and highlights Eurasian independence.
For Pakistan, the meeting with Putin was not only symbolic. Islamabad sees Russia as an emerging partner that can help diversify Pakistan’s energy imports, strengthen its position within Eurasian trade networks and provide political cover at a time when Islamabad often finds itself isolated in Western capitals. Russia is not a replacement for China, nor does Pakistan expect it to be, but it is a useful companion in a world where Islamabad wants more room to maneuver.
In his address to the leaders’ council, Dar attempted to move Pakistan beyond the defensive crouch that has shaped its recent diplomacy. He spoke of deeper regional integration—through trade corridors, infrastructure connectivity, digital development, investment flows and even cultural exchanges. These themes may sound aspirational, but for a country grappling with economic strain and political flux, they represent an attempt to reposition Pakistan as a contributor rather than a crisis state. The SCO, with its blend of large economies and emerging regional players, remains one of the few platforms where Pakistan can speak confidently about economic revival without being overshadowed by the security demands of Washington or the geopolitical rivalry between Delhi and Beijing.
Yet the broader context remains difficult to escape. Pakistan sees regional security through a prism sharpened by its own vulnerabilities. Officials continue to insist that terrorism in the region is not a standalone phenomenon rooted in local grievances. It is, in Islamabad’s view, fuelled by patronage networks that stretch across the Afghan border and, it alleges, strengthened by India’s covert sponsorship of groups working under the banner of the so-called Khawarij. These accusations are neither new nor universally accepted, but they reflect the intensity of Pakistan’s frustration, especially as attacks inside the country have risen again.
For Islamabad, any discussion of stability in South and Central Asia is incomplete without acknowledging what it sees as India’s destabilizing actions and the Afghan Taliban authorities’ tolerance—or at least passive acceptance—of groups hostile to Pakistan. The surge in militant violence along the border, the breakdown of earlier confidence-building measures with Kabul and the persistence of proxy networks have renewed Pakistan’s sense that it is fighting a war shaped by external forces but paid for in Pakistani lives.
This is where the SCO could, in theory, serve a more constructive purpose. With India and Pakistan both seated at the table, and with Afghanistan’s fate casting a shadow over every member state’s strategic calculations, the organization offers a rare forum where grievances can be aired without the theatrics of bilateral confrontation. China and Russia, the two dominant actors in the SCO, have the capacity to push for mediation or at least for a more structured dialogue. But historically the SCO has preferred declarations over decisions. It has been most comfortable as a forum of principle, not enforcement.
The key question, then, is whether the organization is willing to evolve. Can it move beyond symbolic unity and offer practical channels for addressing Pakistan’s security concerns? Can it encourage restraint from India and exert pressure on the Afghan Taliban to control cross-border militancy? Or will it remain an arena where agreements are signed, photographs taken and the deeper disputes left untouched?
For Pakistan, the summit in Moscow was an important—if modest—affirmation that the country is still part of regional conversations that matter. It was a chance to reaffirm friendships, restate priorities and show that despite economic turbulence and political uncertainty, Islamabad is not withdrawing from the regional stage. But diplomacy alone cannot ease the pressures Pakistan faces at home. Economic recovery, counterterrorism efforts and the search for strategic balance all require sustained engagement, not episodic encounters. The SCO may not provide the solutions Pakistan seeks, but it remains one of the few venues where Pakistan can keep arguing for them—and where the region, if it chooses, can listen.
