There is something revealing about the way states behave when political relationships begin to change. Governments that once relied heavily on a particular leader rarely abandon that relationship overnight. They usually begin by protecting institutional links, maintaining discreet channels and testing whether old networks can survive under a new political order. This appears to be the question now hanging over India’s relationship with Bangladesh. The reported visit of the chief of India’s Research and Analysis Wing, R&AW, to Dhaka deserves attention for precisely this reason. The visit, reportedly made at the invitation of Bangladesh’s Directorate General of Forces Intelligence rather than the elected civilian government, came at a politically delicate moment.
Bangladesh is still dealing with the consequences of the fall of Sheikh Hasina, whose government was swept from power after the student uprising of 2024 in which hundreds of innocent civilians were massacred. For years, New Delhi regarded Hasina as one of its most important regional partners. Her government provided India with a degree of strategic predictability in a neighborhood where New Delhi has long been sensitive to security threats, border management and political instability. The relationship was not merely diplomatic. It developed into a dense network of security, intelligence and institutional contacts. That is precisely why the reported R&AW visit has generated questions.
If India is genuinely reassessing its relationship with Bangladesh after Hasina’s fall, then Dhaka may be witnessing a transition from a relationship centered on one political leader to one built around institutions capable of surviving changes in government. If, on the other hand, India is attempting to preserve its influence through intelligence and security channels, then the episode raises a more uncomfortable question: has New Delhi really accepted the political transformation in Bangladesh, or is it simply adapting its methods? The question is particularly important because Hasina remains in India. Her continued presence has become a source of considerable irritation in Bangladesh, especially when she makes public statements from Indian territory.
Dhaka has increasingly objected to what it sees as attempts by the former prime minister to influence Bangladeshi politics from abroad. The political symbolism is difficult to ignore. A leader whose government was removed by a mass uprising remains under Indian protection while Bangladesh attempts to establish a new political equilibrium. Against that background, any reported contact between Indian intelligence officials and Bangladeshi security institutions naturally attracts scrutiny.
There is also a larger lesson in India’s intelligence record abroad. The controversy surrounding the killing of Canadian citizen and Sikh leader Hardeep Singh Nijjar has already demonstrated how allegations of Indian state involvement in operations beyond India’s borders can become a major diplomatic liability. In September 2023, then Canadian prime minister Justin Trudeau told parliament that Canadian security agencies were pursuing credible allegations of a potential link between agents of the Indian government and Nijjar’s killing. Canada subsequently expelled an Indian diplomat. The dispute did not end there. In May 2024, Canadian authorities announced arrests and charges against four people over their alleged involvement in Nijjar’s murder.
Bangladesh does not have to choose between cooperation with India and the protection of its sovereignty. The two are not mutually exclusive. India is Bangladesh’s giant neighbor, an important trading partner and a country with which Dhaka shares a long border, rivers, security concerns and deep historical connections. Intelligence cooperation is also a normal component of relations between neighboring states. No responsible government can simply eliminate such contacts. The problem arises when intelligence relationships become opaque substitutes for political diplomacy. Bangladesh’s current authorities have already indicated that they do not want R&AW to operate in the country as it allegedly did during Hasina’s tenure.
Such a declaration is important because it reflects a wider demand within Bangladeshi politics: that relations with India should be conducted on the basis of sovereign equality rather than political dependency. The reported meetings between the R&AW delegation and senior Bangladeshi officials therefore deserve scrutiny not because intelligence cooperation itself is unusual, but because of the political circumstances in which they took place. If the visit was routine, Dhaka and New Delhi should have little difficulty explaining its purpose. If it involved efforts to preserve legitimate security cooperation, that too should not be controversial. But if intelligence channels are being used to influence the political direction of post-Hasina Bangladesh, the matter becomes considerably more serious.
The reported meetings with Home Affairs Minister Salahuddin Ahmed, senior law enforcement officials and Brig Gen (retd) AKM Shamsul Islam, defence affairs adviser to Tariq Rahman, have added to the perception that security institutions may be assuming a greater role in managing the relationship. The simultaneous diplomatic engagement by India’s High Commissioner, Dinesh Trivedi, with Tariq Rahman is equally notable. His description of the meeting as fruitful, coupled with the remark that India and Bangladesh not only share a border but also “shared dreams”, suggested that New Delhi is trying to open political channels at the same time as security contacts continue. This may be pragmatic diplomacy. It may also be an admission that the old political formula no longer works.
If India has concluded that Hasina’s political future in Bangladesh is effectively over, it would be sensible for New Delhi to diversify its relationships rather than remain tied to a former leader. But there is a difference between accepting political reality and attempting to manage it from behind the scenes. The first is diplomacy. The second risks becoming interference. For Bangladesh, the challenge is equally difficult. Dhaka cannot build a sustainable foreign policy on anti-India rhetoric alone. Political parties may find India an easy target for mobilization, particularly after the fall of a government that was perceived by many Bangladeshis as excessively close to New Delhi.
But geography cannot be changed by slogans. Bangladesh will continue to share a border with India, and cooperation over trade, water, migration, security and regional connectivity will remain unavoidable. What Dhaka can change is the manner in which that relationship is conducted. The new Bangladesh has an opportunity to establish a clear principle: cooperation with India is welcome, but it must take place through transparent and accountable institutions. Intelligence agencies can communicate, but they should not become parallel foreign ministries. Security cooperation can continue, but it must not be allowed to determine political outcome. And diplomatic engagement should not be used as a cover for interference in domestic politics.
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