By Muhammad Mohsin Iqbal
The United Nations Security Council was created in 1945 for a world emerging from the devastation of the second world war. Its five permanent members were given veto powers to keep the major powers within the international system and prevent disputes between them from turning into wider conflict. That arrangement may have reflected the realities of the time. Eight decades later, however, the world has changed dramatically while the Council has barely done so. The United Nations now has 193 member states and represents a global population of more than eight billion. Yet the structure of its most powerful body still reflects the political balance of 1945. Apart from the increase in elected members from six to 10 in 1965, the Council has remained largely frozen.
The result is an institution that often struggles to speak for the international community it is meant to protect. The case for reform is therefore compelling. The difficult question is what kind of reform would make the Council more representative without making it even less capable of acting. Since the General Assembly began its intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council reform in 2008, the debate has revolved around membership, the veto, regional representation, the Council’s size and its working methods. Africa remains without a permanent seat, while Latin America, South Asia and much of the Muslim world remain inadequately represented.
The imbalance has strengthened the perception that the Council is an inheritance of an older, largely Western-dominated international order rather than an institution reflecting today’s geopolitical realities. There is understandable frustration among countries seeking a greater voice. Major states such as Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Türkiye have legitimate arguments for stronger representation. India, Germany and others have also pressed their claims for permanent membership. But representation alone should not be confused with reform. Giving more states permanent seats and vetoes could simply reproduce the very privilege that has made the existing system so difficult to change.
The competing proposals have exposed this problem. The Group of Four wants permanent seats for itself alongside two permanent African members. African countries have demanded two permanent seats with full veto rights. France and Mexico have called for voluntary restraint in the use of the veto, particularly in situations involving mass atrocities. The Uniting for Consensus group, led by Pakistan and supported by countries including Italy, Mexico, Argentina, Canada and South Korea, takes a different approach: it opposes expanding the permanent category and instead favors more elected seats with longer, renewable terms. That last proposal deserves greater attention.
The experience of recent conflicts shows why adding veto powers is a risky answer to a legitimate demand for representation. The Council has repeatedly been paralyzed when the interests of a permanent member collide with the demands of the wider membership. The repeated American vetoes on resolutions concerning Israel and Gaza are a particularly stark example of how one permanent member can prevent collective action even when a large part of the international community supports it. Creating additional veto-holders would not solve this problem. It could multiply it. Every new permanent member would bring its own strategic priorities and national interests into a system in which a single veto can stop collective action.
The Council could become more representative on paper while becoming less effective in practice. Permanent membership also carries a deeper problem: it is extremely difficult to reverse. Once another country acquires a permanent seat, future generations would inherit that privilege regardless of changing circumstances, political conduct or the emergence of new powers. Reform should not create another layer of institutional privilege that future members of the United Nations are unable to reconsider. India’s bid illustrates the complexity. Its size, economy and regional influence give it a strong case for a greater international role. But permanent membership should also involve confidence in a country’s commitment to the principles and obligations of the UN Charter.
India’s long-standing dispute with Pakistan over Jammu and Kashmir, including its rejection of a UN-supervised plebiscite and its unilateral constitutional changes in the territory, raises questions that cannot simply be set aside in a discussion about permanent authority. Concerns over human rights, the treatment of minorities and refugees, and aspects of India’s wider foreign policy also deserve scrutiny. Germany presents a different problem. Europe already has two permanent members, France and Britain. Adding another European permanent seat would do little to correct the geographical imbalance that lies at the heart of the reform debate.
(The writer is a parliamentary expert with decades of experience in legislative research and media affairs, leading policy support initiatives for lawmakers on complex national and international issues, and can be reached at editorial@metro-Morning.com)
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