By Asghar Ali Mubarak
Diplomacy, for all its frustrations and slow rhythms, remains the least destructive instrument available to states confronting crisis. War promises clarity through force but delivers only ruin, deepened grievances and cycles of retaliation that last generations. Diplomacy, by contrast, is an exercise in restraint. It is the patient art of managing interests, acknowledging realities and seeking compromise where none appears immediately possible. At moments of regional tension, such as the current turmoil surrounding Iran, its value becomes not merely moral but strategic. The unrest in Iran, triggered by economic hardship and aggravated by political discontent, has unfolded against a backdrop of intense international pressure and regional anxiety.
Inflation, currency devaluation and shortages of essential goods have pushed ordinary Iranians into the streets, while the state has responded with a heavy security footprint. Tehran insists it has restored order and blames foreign actors for fueling violence, pointing to attacks on security personnel and what it describes as terrorist-style incidents. Western capitals, meanwhile, have expressed concern over the treatment of protesters and restrictions on basic freedoms. Between these positions lies a dangerous space where miscalculation could turn domestic crisis into regional conflagration. Pakistan’s response has been cautious and telling. Speaking at the United Nations, its permanent representative stressed the importance of peaceful resolution and warned against external interference, framing stability in Iran as a shared regional interest rather than an ideological preference.
Islamabad’s message was clear: pressure and threats will only harden positions, while dialogue offers at least the possibility of de-escalation. For Pakistan, this is not abstract diplomacy. It shares a long and sensitive border with Iran, one that cuts through Balochistan, a province already vulnerable to militancy and economic neglect. Instability across that border would inevitably spill over, compounding Pakistan’s own security and economic challenges. This explains why Pakistani leaders have maintained active diplomatic channels with Tehran, including direct contact between foreign ministers. Such engagement is less about endorsement and more about insulation. Islamabad has little appetite for regime change in Iran or for seeing the country pushed further into isolation.
History in the region suggests that collapsing states do not remain contained problems; they export refugees, weapons and instability. For Pakistan, a weakened Iran would not be a geopolitical victory but a source of prolonged insecurity. The international response to Iran’s protests has exposed familiar fault lines. Washington’s rhetoric has oscillated between restraint and threat, with the US president publicly claiming that only his own judgement prevented military action. Reports that Gulf states urged caution underline a quiet but significant regional consensus: war with Iran would be catastrophic. Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Oman, despite their differing relationships with Tehran, all recognize that open conflict would derail economic ambitions and destabilize energy markets.
Their diplomatic interventions, largely behind closed doors, appear to have bought time, even if only temporarily. Iran, for its part, presents itself as a state under siege, facing what its leaders describe as a hybrid war waged through sanctions, information campaigns and covert action. The restoration, even partial, of internet services after prolonged shutdowns suggests an attempt to project normalcy, while official statements emphasize sovereignty and resilience. Yet assertions of control cannot obscure the underlying economic distress. Inflation and unemployment are not conspiracies engineered abroad; they are lived realities for millions of Iranians. Suppressing protests may restore order on the streets, but it does little to address the causes that drove people there.
The risk is that continued confrontation, whether through sanctions or military threats, will entrench the very dynamics that hardliners on all sides claim to oppose. Iran’s leadership has long argued that hostility from the United States and its allies justifies a securitized state and limits political openness. Conversely, Western policymakers point to repression and regional interventions as reasons for maintaining pressure. This circular logic leaves little room for the kind of diplomatic engagement that might gradually alter behavior and rebuild trust. Pakistan’s insistence on diplomacy reflects a broader regional instinct that escalation serves no one. Even states deeply wary of Iran’s regional role prefer managed rivalry to open conflict.
Oman’s efforts to facilitate dialogue between Tehran and Washington, and Qatar’s quiet mediation, are examples of pragmatic diplomacy rooted in self-interest. They recognize that stability, however imperfect, is preferable to chaos. There is also a wider lesson here about the limits of coercion. Decades of sanctions have not produced political transformation in Iran, but they have weakened the economy and hardened nationalist sentiment. Military action, were it to occur, would likely unify the population behind the state, at least temporarily, and devastate an already fragile region. Diplomacy does not guarantee success, but it preserves space for outcomes other than disaster. For Pakistan, advocating dialogue is consistent with its own experiences.
(The writer is a senior journalist covering various beats, can be reached at editorial@metro-morning.com)
