The defence and strategic agreement concluded in Makkah between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye has attracted attention well beyond the three countries that signed it. That is itself an indication of its importance. In a region accustomed to military alliances, shifting partnerships and strategic rivalries, a new security arrangement is bound to be examined through the prism of the conflicts already shaping the Middle East. Yet the more important question is not whether the agreement will change the regional balance of power. It is whether it can help change the political habits that have kept the region trapped in insecurity for far too long.
The Middle East has no shortage of military capability. What it lacks is a durable architecture of trust. Governments have spent decades strengthening armed forces, purchasing sophisticated weapons and building strategic partnerships, while diplomatic channels have too often been treated as secondary instruments. The result has been a region in which a military move by one state can quickly be interpreted as a threat by another, prompting countermeasures that deepen the very insecurity they were intended to prevent.
Against that background, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s insistence that the Makkah agreement is defensive rather than aggressive is important. The stated objective is to strengthen cooperation between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye while contributing to peace, security and prosperity. Such language should not be dismissed as diplomatic convention. Defence agreements acquire their real meaning from the policies pursued under their umbrella. If the pact is used to strengthen collective security, improve coordination and deter threats without becoming a vehicle for confrontation, it could make a constructive contribution to an exceptionally fragile regional environment.
There is also little reason to portray the agreement as an abrupt strategic rupture. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have maintained close security ties for decades. Their relationship has included military cooperation and responsibilities associated with the protection of the holy sites. Pakistan and Türkiye, meanwhile, have developed a substantial defence relationship of their own, supported by political trust and growing military cooperation. The agreement therefore appears less like the creation of an entirely new partnership and more like an attempt to give greater structure to relationships that already have considerable depth.
That continuity could be one of its strengths. Alliances built on existing relationships are generally less vulnerable to sudden changes in political mood than arrangements created solely in response to an immediate crisis. But continuity should not become an excuse for complacency. The three countries will need to define clearly what the agreement means in practice, particularly if it is to reassure countries outside the partnership rather than encourage them to prepare for another bloc confrontation.
The response from Iran is consequently significant. Tehran has said that the agreement does not pose a threat to Iran and has pointed to its own close relations with Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye. In the present Middle Eastern climate, that is not an insignificant statement. New military arrangements are often viewed with suspicion, particularly by states that fear encirclement or a change in the regional balance. Iran’s measured response creates diplomatic space that the signatories should preserve rather than squander.
Pakistan’s decision to brief Tehran directly on the agreement was therefore sound diplomacy. Regional security cannot be built through assumptions about what neighboring states might think. It requires communication, particularly when military cooperation is involved. A country that seeks to reassure its neighbors should not wait for rumors or hostile interpretations to fill the information gap. Direct engagement can reduce the possibility of miscalculation and prevent defensive measures from being mistaken for preparations for conflict.
This is particularly important at a moment when the wider region is already carrying an extraordinary security burden. The confrontation between Iran and the United States, tensions surrounding the Strait of Hormuz and the continuing accumulation of military capabilities have consequences that extend far beyond the countries immediately involved. The Gulf is central to global energy supplies and maritime trade. Any prolonged instability there affects shipping, insurance, commodity prices and economies far removed from the battlefield.
The lesson of recent decades should be obvious. Military pressure can alter an opponent’s calculations, but it rarely resolves the political disputes that produced confrontation in the first place. The region has repeatedly demonstrated the limits of coercion. Wars have weakened states without eliminating grievances, sanctions have inflicted economic pain without necessarily producing political settlements, and military interventions have often created consequences that outlast the governments that ordered them.
The Makkah agreement should therefore be judged against a higher standard than the narrow logic of deterrence. It should ask what can be done to make conflict less likely in the first place. That means improving communication between defence establishments, encouraging political dialogue and building mechanisms through which disputes can be addressed before they become military crises. If the agreement remains confined to military coordination, it will have a limited horizon. If it becomes part of a broader diplomatic effort, its significance could be considerably greater.
There is a wider question here for the Muslim world as well. Many Muslim-majority countries face common challenges, from terrorism and political instability to economic insecurity, energy vulnerability and the consequences of regional wars. Yet their responses have often remained fragmented. Strategic cooperation is therefore a legitimate aspiration. But cooperation should not be confused with the creation of an exclusive military bloc.
The Muslim world does not need another alliance defined by who is outside it. It needs partnerships defined by what their members can contribute to peace. A credible regional security framework would have to rest on respect for sovereignty, non-interference, economic cooperation and a commitment to resolving disputes through diplomacy. It should make space for countries with different political systems and strategic interests rather than demanding uniformity.
This is where the Makkah agreement faces its greatest test. The signatories will inevitably be watched by countries that were not part of it. If their actions suggest that the pact is intended to contain or isolate another state, suspicions will grow and the agreement could become another line dividing an already fractured region. If, on the other hand, they use their combined diplomatic weight to encourage dialogue, the pact could acquire a meaning considerably larger than its original military purpose.
