By S.M. Inam
Pakistan appears to be entering another period of constitutional uncertainty, where political speculation, institutional calculations and governance debates are converging at a highly sensitive moment for the federation. Reports surrounding a proposed “28th Constitutional Amendment” have generated widespread discussion not simply because of the legal changes being contemplated, but because they touch the central question that has shaped Pakistan’s political history for decades: who truly controls the state — the federation or the provinces?
Although no official constitutional package has yet been formally unveiled, the discussions themselves are revealing. They suggest that powerful circles within the state increasingly believe the existing administrative structure has failed to deliver effective governance, economic coordination and institutional stability. Supporters of reform argue that Pakistan’s fragmented administrative system has weakened policymaking capacity, slowed development projects and allowed provincial inefficiency to deepen, particularly in large urban centers such as Karachi.
The possibility of transferring sectors like education, health and finance back to the federal government would mark one of the most consequential constitutional shifts since the passage of the 18th Amendment. That amendment was celebrated by democratic forces as a historic correction to decades of overcentralisation. It granted provinces greater autonomy and attempted to address long-standing grievances regarding resource distribution and political marginalization.
Yet constitutional ideals and administrative realities have increasingly diverged. Provincial autonomy was intended to improve governance by bringing decision-making closer to local populations. Instead, critics argue that in several provinces the devolution of power created stronger political monopolies without significantly improving public service delivery. The worsening civic collapse in Karachi has become the most visible symbol of this dysfunction. Pakistan’s commercial capital continues to struggle with broken infrastructure, flooding, transport failures, uncontrolled urban expansion and weak municipal coordination despite repeated political promises.
However, reversing aspects of provincial autonomy would carry profound political risks. The 18th Amendment was not merely administrative legislation; it represented a political compromise between competing national forces. Smaller provinces viewed it as a constitutional safeguard against domination by the center. Any effort to weaken that arrangement could revive old fears regarding federal overreach and political imbalance. In a country where provincial grievances have historically fueled instability, constitutional restructuring without consensus may deepen mistrust rather than resolve inefficiency.
The debate surrounding the National Finance Commission Award reflects similar tensions. For years, federal authorities have quietly expressed concern that the revenue-sharing arrangement leaves Islamabad financially constrained while provinces receive expanding fiscal space without corresponding accountability. Provinces, meanwhile, insist that federal complaints often mask a desire to reassert centralized control over national resources.
Karachi remains central to these debates. The city generates much of Pakistan’s economic activity yet continues to suffer from administrative fragmentation and political contestation. Criticism of governance under the Asif Ali Zardari-aligned Pakistan People’s Party administration in Sindh has intensified as urban conditions deteriorate further. Increasingly, political analysts warn that the party risks becoming more regionally isolated if governance failures continue to dominate public perception.
Against this backdrop, speculation surrounding new administrative provinces has gained renewed momentum. In theory, creating smaller provinces could improve governance and reduce bureaucratic concentration. Regions such as South Punjab have long argued that administrative neglect stems from excessively centralized provincial structures. Yet the method of implementing such reforms is crucial. If administrative boundaries are altered through executive authority or presidential ordinances without broad parliamentary consensus, the legitimacy of the process would almost certainly be questioned.
The broader political context also matters. Reports suggesting tensions within the post-election power-sharing arrangement indicate that Pakistan’s coalition structure remains fluid. Following the 2024 elections, widespread political speculation suggested an understanding between the Pakistan Muslim League (N) and the Pakistan Peoples Party regarding rotational leadership at the federal level. Yet evolving regional dynamics and growing diplomatic engagement by Shehbaz Sharif appear to have altered those calculations.
Supporters of the current arrangement argue that continuity is necessary during a period of geopolitical uncertainty. Pakistan is simultaneously attempting to stabilize its economy, strengthen ties with Gulf partners, manage strategic relations with China and maintain engagement with Western capitals. In such circumstances, policymakers may view leadership continuity as preferable to political experimentation.
Similarly, intensified efforts against corruption networks, illegal financial systems and extremist financing are undoubtedly necessary. Pakistan’s economic fragility cannot be separated from entrenched corruption, informal economies and weak regulatory enforcement. Yet anti-corruption campaigns have historically lost credibility when perceived as selective or politically motivated. Public trust will depend not on announcements, but on consistency, transparency and institutional impartiality.
For now, much remains speculative. Political rumors often travel faster than constitutional reality in Pakistan. Nevertheless, the discussions themselves reveal a deeper truth: influential policymakers appear increasingly convinced that the existing administrative framework is unsustainable in its current form.
Pakistan undoubtedly requires institutional reform, stronger governance and administrative efficiency. However, constitutional restructuring imposed without democratic consensus risks creating new instability while attempting to solve old problems. Durable reform cannot emerge solely from executive power, political bargaining or institutional pressure. It must rest upon constitutional legitimacy, parliamentary ownership and public confidence — foundations that remain fragile in Pakistan’s evolving political order.
(The writer is a former government officer and a senior analyst on national and international affairs, can be reached at inam@metro-morning.com)
