By Uzma Ehtasham
The confrontation between the United States and Iran has reached a point where neither side can easily claim that continued conflict serves its interests. The military and economic costs are mounting, the wider Middle East remains exposed to further instability and the international community is increasingly concerned about the consequences of another prolonged crisis. Yet ending a war is often harder than starting one. Governments can order military action within hours, but rebuilding trust, negotiating compromises and persuading domestic constituencies to accept them can take months or years.
The greatest danger now is that the conflict develops a momentum of its own. Once military confrontation becomes embedded in national security policy, there are always interests that begin to depend on its continuation. Defence industries benefit from higher production, military institutions acquire greater influence and political actors can find it easier to rally public support around an external threat than around the difficult compromises required for peace. The Middle East has seen this cycle before. Each new confrontation leaves behind grievances that become the foundation for the next one.
Iran’s six conditions for the complete reopening of the Strait of Hormuz illustrate the depth of the disagreement. Tehran wants guarantees that Iran will not be threatened, an end to what it describes as aggression against Iran and its allies, the lifting of the naval blockade and withdrawal of US forces from the region around Iran, compensation for wartime losses, the removal of sanctions and the unconditional release of frozen Iranian assets. These are sweeping demands and, in their present form, would be difficult for Washington to accept.
But dismissing them entirely would be equally unwise. They reveal the issues that Tehran considers fundamental to any settlement. Iran is not simply seeking an end to military exchanges; it wants assurances about its security, its economic future and its ability to operate without the permanent threat of American military or economic pressure. Any serious negotiation will have to address these concerns, even if the final settlement falls well short of Iran’s stated demands.
The same principle applies to Washington. The United States has its own security calculations and will not abandon them merely because the costs of confrontation have increased. Its concerns about Iranian military capabilities, regional armed groups and the security of commercial shipping are not going to disappear through declarations of goodwill. But pressure alone cannot resolve these issues. Sanctions, military deployments and threats may create leverage, but leverage is useful only when it ultimately brings the other side to the negotiating table.
That is where the present crisis appears to be failing. Tehran has indicated that direct negotiations cannot resume while Washington continues what it regards as violations of existing understandings. Iranian officials have accused the United States of failing to honor commitments associated with the interim arrangement reached through diplomatic efforts involving Oman. At the same time, messages continue to pass through intermediaries. Such channels can be useful during periods of extreme tension, but they cannot replace sustained diplomacy between the governments whose decisions determine whether the conflict ends or expands.
Washington’s position also contains an uncomfortable contradiction. The United States says it is seeking arrangements to ensure the safe movement of vessels through the Strait of Hormuz while maintaining military pressure and preparing for the possibility of a longer confrontation. Reports that the Pentagon has asked American defence companies to accelerate weapons and ammunition production reinforce the impression that Washington is preparing for escalation even as it speaks about de-escalation.
Military preparedness may be presented as a precaution, and governments have a responsibility to protect their forces. But diplomacy becomes much harder when every precaution is interpreted by the other side as preparation for another attack. The danger is not merely political mistrust. In a heavily militarized environment, a single miscalculation can have consequences far beyond what either government intended.
The Strait of Hormuz makes the situation particularly serious. It is one of the world’s most important energy routes, and disruption there would not remain a local problem. Oil and gas prices would come under pressure, shipping and insurance costs would rise and economies already struggling with inflation would face another shock. Countries thousands of miles from Iran and the Gulf would ultimately pay part of the price. This is why freedom of navigation should not be treated as a bargaining chip in a contest between Washington and Tehran.
Neither side should confuse endurance with victory. A conflict that weakens Iran, burdens the United States, destabilizes neighboring countries and damages the global economy cannot produce a meaningful winner. Even a government that achieves some of its military objectives may find that the political and economic consequences make those gains difficult to sustain.
The responsibility also extends to regional allies and armed groups. No diplomatic settlement can survive if governments reach an understanding while actors operating in their name or in support of their interests continue to attack one another. A ceasefire must therefore be accompanied by mechanisms that reduce the risk of provocation and establish clear consequences for violations. Otherwise every pause in fighting will become little more than preparation for the next round.
The United States and Iran should recognize that compromise is not surrender. For Washington, diplomacy does not mean abandoning legitimate security concerns. For Tehran, accepting a negotiated settlement does not mean conceding every point demanded by the United States. A durable agreement will almost certainly require both governments to accept outcomes that fall short of their maximum objectives.
The reopening of the Strait of Hormuz should therefore form part of a broader settlement rather than a temporary concession extracted under pressure. Guarantees for commercial navigation, gradual sanctions relief, arrangements concerning frozen assets and credible security assurances could provide the foundations for a more sustainable agreement. Such a process would require international guarantees and independent mechanisms for monitoring compliance, but these are practical problems rather than reasons to abandon diplomacy.
(The writer is a public health professional, journalist, and possesses expertise in health communication, having keen interest in national and international affairs, can be reached at uzma@metro-morning.com)
